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Abstract 
The paper examines patterns of post-conflict aid in a sample of 14 countries, with in-depth 
qualitative analysis of seven cases. The study shows that - contrary to the findings of World Bank-
supported research in this area - donors do not respond to a CNN-effect by rushing in aid soon after 
peace is declared while scaling back rapidly during the remaining post-war decade. Rather, post-war 
aid follows several patterns and can best be understood as strategic behavior designed to promote a 
range of economic and political objectives. This paper also questions the related policy 
recommendation of the World Bank research, which is that post-conflict aid should be designed to 
maximize economic growth during the first decade of peace. Rather, this paper argues, other aid 
strategies are more relevant to stabilize peace in the short run and sustain it in the longer run. 
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1. Introduction 
Increasingly, the proper sequencing of aid in terms of timing and magnitude is seen as an important 
aspect of peacebuilding strategies in the aftermath of civil wars. Donors have pursued different 
strategies, sometimes seeking to "jump-start" the economy through massive infusion of aid in the 
immediate post-conflict phase (as in Bosnia); at other times favouring a slow pace of phasing in 
even of modest aid flows, citing absorption capacity (as in Cambodia). Recipient governments 
typically argue for immediate and large-scale inflows to cement the peace settlement, or, as in post-
Taliban Afghanistan, to prevent structures embedded in the wartime political economy from 
creating a "narco-mafia state". The literature provides few guidelines. While there have been 
numerous case studies of post-war aid, most have been project oriented and yield little 
understanding of what constitutes appropriate strategies to sustain the post-conflict peace 
(Woodward 2002.). Research supported by the World Bank claims to have identified optimal timing 
and magnitude of aid required to sustain post-war peace, and which diverge markedly from actual 
practice (World Bank 2003, Collier&Hoeffler 2004) Their general nature (being based on statistical 
analysis of highly aggregated data) and a small number of observations limit the relevance of the 
findings, however.  
 
This article takes the World Bank research in this area as a starting point, but disaggregates the data 
and supplements with a small-N qualitative analysis. We first examine overall trends in types of 
post-conflict aid over time, then aid identify patterns in seven country cases, and conclude by 
analysing the relationship between aid, economic growth and peace in light of the case studies. As 
other studies have shown (Sambanis 2004) disaggregated data and comparative case studies can 
significantly enrich the analysis. This article identifies several patterns of post-conflict aid, each of 
which reflects a specific historical context and related policy rationales. While several aid patterns 
diverge from the optimal sequencing recommended by the World Bank research, the aid 
nevertheless helped to stabilize peace in the short run, and all were compatible with a sustained the 
peace in the longer-run.  
2. Patterns of aid 
The World Bank supported research on the sequencing of aid in post-conflict situations is part of a 
larger argument on the relationship between aid, growth and peace.2 To maximize the positive 
impact on peace, it is argued, aid to countries emerging from civil war should be massive (twice the 
level of aid to countries that are not post-conflict), and should be phased in slowly to peak in the 
middle of the first post-conflict decade before tapering back to "normal" levels. In fact, it is 
claimed, donors do precisely the opposite. They rush in with aid when peace is declared, but rapidly 
scale back instead of staying for the long haul. The reason is a generalized “CNN effect” -
“politicians like to respond to the newsworthy event of peace….[while] aid bureaucracies try to get 
aid allocations back to normal” (Collier&Hoeffler 2004, p. 1137). 
 
The conclusion has affirmed conventional wisdom in aid circles to the effect that donors frontload 
aid in a dysfunctional manner. But to what extent is frontloading typical of post-conflict donor 
                                                 
2 The argument was initially presented in a World Bank research paper (Working Paper 2902, October 2002), 
when Collier was head of the research department in the Bank. The paper was in 2003 posted on the website 
http://users.ox.ac.uk/~ball0144/research.htm as Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Aid, Policy and Growth in 
Post-conflict Societies,” and was published in the European Economic Review, vol. 48(2004) 1125-1145.  
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behaviour across the wide variety of post-conflict cases? To assess donor behaviour in more detail, 
we used the same kind of Official Development Assistance (ODA) data as Collier and Hoeffler did, 
but used annual figures rather than four-year averages, and distinguished between type of aid and 
historical periods. 3  
 
First, we separated relief aid from the aggregate ODA figures.4 As we wanted to test the 
"frontloading" hypothesis as precisely as possible, we used the civil war sample of 
Collier&Hoeffler, which contains 14 countries and 17 post-conflict situations.5 Altogether, the post-
conflict years of the countries in the sample span almost three decades, from 1971, when the first 
civil war ended, to 1997, when the Collier&Hoeffler data set stops. When allowing for type of aid 
disbursed to post-conflic t countries in these years, we see that only relief aid is “frontloaded” 
(Fig.I). Other types of aid – which we have lumped under the general heading of development aid - 
are gradually phased in to peak in the third year after the conflict ended. Admittedly, this aid then 
tapers off, and our findings are not necessarily inconsistent with a frontloading pattern if we 
aggregated the aid and used four-year averages. But from a policy-analysis perspective the 
disaggregated result is more useful than the gross pattern in that it recognises the separate role of – 
and rationale for - humanitarian aid in the immediate post-conflict period. The primary purpose of 
such aid is not to promote economic growth or indeed development generally. Rather it is to save 
lives in the short run. In this perspective, frontloading humanitarian aid is eminently rational and 
appropriate donor behaviour.  
 
The rapid decline of development assistance from the fourth post-war year seems to violate the 
declared policy intent of many donors to the effect that aid agents must situate post-war 
reconstruction in a long-term development perspective and demonstrate staying-power. The 
explanation may in part be technical: transfers recorded by OECD/DAC as Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) is above all concessional assistance; loans with less than a 25% grant element are 
not included.  6 Non-grant assistance may well increase in proportion of total aid as the post-war 
decade progresses and donors turn from the immediate tasks of reconstruction and peace 
implementation to “normal” development programs.  
 
 
                                                 
3 The Collier&Hoeffler study does not distinguish by between relief assis tance and other types of aid in the 
post-conflict decade, use four-year averages even though the entire post-conflict period covered for each 
country is no more than a decade (and in several cases less), and include cases that span almost three decades. 
Aid figures are from the OECD/DAC database International Development Statistics, available at 
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/50/17/5037721.htm. All values are in constant US dollars (2002). Note that ODA  
includes only assistance in the form of grants and loans with at least a 25% grant element. Our work and that 
of Collier and Hoeffler therefore capture only part of the external assistance flow. 
4 The OECD data are disaggregated by sector. For "Relief Aid", we used emergency assistance+relief food 
aid+non-food emergency and distress relief. The last item also includes certain aid to refugees in donor 
countries, as there is no separate specification for this item. For "Development Aid" we used total ODA (all 
sectors), minus those we included in "Relief Aid". In the charts below, the respective post-war years for each 
country is coded as Year 1,2,3 etc. 
5 Their sample lists 2 civil wars for Nicaragua, although less than a decade intervenes between the end of the 
first (1979) and the beginning date of the second (1982). The same applies to Guatemala, where they list 2 
wars with only 5 years of intervening peace. The result is a larger N than if a rule of one post-war decade had 
been rigidly applied.  For the analysis shown in Fig I, we used the 2004 version of their post-conflict sample, 
which includes El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guatemala (2), India, Indonesia, Morocoo, Nicaragua (2), Nigeria (2), 
Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Zimbabwe.  
6 See footnote 4 above. In some cases donors came over time to prefer bilateral over multilateral channels. 
This was the case in Bosnia, where several donors preferred bilateral transfers in order to impose more 
stringent political conditionality that what the World Bank recommended (Hurtic, Sapcania and Woodward 
2000, pp. 347-50). 
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Fig I: Development and Relief Aid 
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Second, we took account of the fact that the international aid regime has changed dramatically in 
recent years. The end of the Cold War signified a systemic change in the aid regime. Initially ad hoc 
and programmatically incoherent, donor responses soon developed into a comprehensive, 
multilateral aid regime for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance designed to consolidate peace 
in the aftermath of civil wars and similar violent conflict. The change entailed a progressive 
standardisation of aid interventions with increasingly agreed-upon formulas for the nature and 
sequencing of aid, improved coordination and clearer division of labour among aid agencies. As a 
measure of growing institutionalization, the term “post-conflict” had by the mid-1990s become a 
standard policy term used in the aid community as well as among scholars.7 When analysing aid 
patterns it therefore makes sense to distinguish between post-conflict situations before and after 
1990. This leaves us with a rather small sample in each group, but the results (Fig II and III) are 
nevertheless suggestive.8 In the "old conflicts" (which ended before 1990), both relief and 
development aid was phased in gradually. The frontloading characteristic does not appear until after 
the new aid regime took shape in the 1990s. The change reflects the greater international 
involvement in forging the series of peace agreements that ended the (internationally assisted) civil 
                                                 
7 The World Bank’s Post-Conflict Unit was established in 1994, the IMF followed with a post-conflict 
emergency assistance program in 1995. 
8 To get a minimally meaningful sample size, we collected data for all 26 countries on the long list of 
Collier&Hoeffler (2003 version), and added Cambodia, Mozambique and Bosnia. To get a longer post-
conflict period in which to observe trends, we counted only 1civil war each in Guatemala and Nicaragua. This 
gave us 12 new and 10 old conflicts. 
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wars of the Cold War, as well as those following the break-up of the Soviet Union. All of these 
settlements had a comprehensive peace implementation agenda, and most came with a sizable price 
tag and 2-4 year implementation periods that were presented to pledging conferences. As a result, 
peace implementation tended to became a frontloaded aid activity. 
 
 
Fig II. Old Conflicts – Development and Relief Aid 
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Although not addressed by the Collier&Hoeffler study, the distinction between disbursements and 
commitments is central to the post-war aid debate. The failure of donors to match promises with 
disbursement has been a serious source of tension in some recipient-donor relations, as in post-
Taliban Afghanistan (CIC/CARE 2004). Pledging conferences have been an important resource 
mobilization tool for the post-conflict aid regime, probably with the quite intended effect of driving 
up the level of funds committed. Whether or not a systematic gap between commitments and 
disbursements exists, is more unclear. Case study materials  show a varied picture, with major gaps 
in some cases and virtually none in others (Forman and Stewart 2000). Using aid data from post- 
civil war aid in 12 “new” cases, (i.e. where the conflict ended after 1990),9 we found a marked gap 
between disbursement gap in the early years after peace, but a subsequent narrowing.  10 By the 
middle of the post-war decade, commitments and disbursement levels converged, possibly 
reflecting increased awareness of recipient absorption capacity over time, fewer pledging 
conferences for the country in question, and donor fatigue more generally. Fig IV also helps explain 
why it is widely assumed that aid is rushed in soon after peace is declared but then rapidly fall off. 
The commitment curve follows the dynamic of frontloading – big promises are made in the early 
                                                 
9 The cases are Bosnia, Cambodia, Congo, El Salvador, Guaremala, India, Morocco, Moazambique, Niaragua, 
Peru, Rwanda and Somalia. 
10 Figures used include both relief and development aid, i.e. ODA totals. If loans from the international 
financial institutions were included, the gap between commitments and disbursements might be greater. One 
careful study of post-war Cambodia found that the bilateral donors had a better disbursement rate than the 
international development banks, mainly because the latter were withholding funds when conditions such as 
local counterpart funding were not met. Overall, disbursement rates improved over time, from under 60% 
during the first three years of peace, to over 90% in later years. Peou 2000, p. 85.  
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post-war years but then decline markedly - and big promises attract attention. Actual disbursements, 
by contrast, although steadier are less politically visible.  
 
 
Fig III New Conflicts – Development and Relief Aid 
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Fig IV: Official Development Assistance: Commitments and Disbursements after“New” 
Conflicts  
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3. Country cases 
What kind of interests and objectives shape the sequencing of post-war aid? Such aid is typically 
inserted in a deeply politicized context. The principal domestic actors are often recent enemies and 
remain protagonists in shaping the peace. International actors have frequently been involved in both 
waging the war and mediating the peace and have significant interests in securing a particular kind 
of post-conflict order. Peacebuilding strategies, in other words, are fundamentally political in 
nature, as several analysts have observed (Cousens et al. 2001, Boyce 2003). In this context, it 
seems unlikely that a”CNN effect”  by itself will significantly determine the aid policies of donors. 
More likely, aid patterns will reflect strategic rationales of various kinds. Donor strategic 
considerations - political as well as economic - would seem to be particularly pronounced in the 
“new” post-conflict situations of the 1990s where the UN and the major donors were heavily 
involved in forging the peace settlements.  
 
To examine variations in aid patterns over time as well as among countries, we selected seven post-
conflict cases for more detailed analysis. 11 This small-N qualitative approach enabled us to identify 
and explain the shape of the individual aid curves. As an expression of total assistance, each country 
aid curve typically masks a variety of donor interests and institutional concerns as well as different 
degrees of aid coordination. Nevertheless, each of the patterns that appeared seemed to suggest an 
overarching, coherent rationale. Of the seven cases – Bosnia, Cambodia, the three Central American 
post-conflict countries, and Mozambique and Rwanda - the first two immediately stand out as 
contrasting cases in terms of both magnitude and timing of aid. We shall therefore first consider 
these two, and then turn to the remaining countries.  
(i) Bosnia and Cambodia  
The Bosnian post-war phase opened with the Dayton peace agreement, signed in December 1995. 
As Fig V shows, except for one year, there is little difference between aid commitments and 
disbursements. The remarkable aspect of the aid picture is the very high aid volume in the first four 
years, followed by a dramatic decline. While the curve does not suggest a sharp frontloading of aid 
– the build-up during the first 3 years after Dayton is rather steady – the mild frontloading is 
accentuated by the subsequent sharp reduction. The pattern can readily be explained with reference 
to deliberate aid strategies and political events. The World Bank, which along with EU had the 
primary institutional responsibility for organizing post-war aid to based, designed a strategy where 
early and massive infusions of aid for infrastructure reconstruction would “jump-start“ the economy 
(Hurtic, Šapacanin and Woodward 2000, World Bank 1996). This resulted in a 4-year Priority 
Reconstruction and Recovery Program (PRP), formally launched at what turned out to be the first of 
several pledging conferences in December 1995. Over four billion dollars of the initial price tag of 
5.1 billion were disbursed. While this was only part of the overall aid picture, and did not cover a 
range of separately funded multilateral and bilateral projects, the PRP set the stage for the overall 
aid effort. The mammoth aid program came to an end at the same time that the 1999 crisis in 
Kosovo and subsequent NATO intervention occurred, which presented donors with competing 
priorities (year 4 on the chart). At the same time, disagreements among donors (particularly on 
conditionality), delays (related donor requirements and institutional procedures as well as lagging 
cooperation on the recipient side) created a cumulative frustration in the donor community over the 
                                                 
11 The Collier&Hoeffler 2004 sample again served as a starting point. Of their 17 civil wars, we excluded “the 
old” cases (which ended before 1990), as well as those that ended without a distinct, internationally supported 
post-war settlement. We added Rwanda, which was not classified as a civil war by Collier and Hoeffler 
because the 1990-94 war ended with genocide. We also added Bosnia, Cambodia and Mozambique – all 
major “new” post-war settlements with international involvement. Collier& Hoeffler lacked data for these 
countries on other dimensions of their analysis, and hence excluded them.  
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difficulties and dysfunctionalities of an aid program involving massive transfers in the kind of 
environment that prevailed post-war Bosnia . Major media reports in mid-1999, although quite 
possibly exaggerated, concluded that aid had generated systematic, new corruption and helped 
sustain the power of wartime and pre-war elites in ways that did not further the Dayton agenda of 
democratic development and economic recovery. The recognition that institutional developments 
had to precede liberalisation and effective utilisation of aid was gaining ground. So was awareness 
that Bosnia would be saddled with major new debt unless the grant element was increased. The 
various element of the aid picture came together in a formal reassessment over priorities announced 
in the Brussels 
 
 
Fig. V Official Development Assistance – Bosnia and Cambodia 
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Declaration of the Peace Implementation Council in May 2000. The declaration outlined a change 
of aid strategy that entailed lesser volume of monies and greater emphasis on institution building 
(ESI 2000) 
 
The high level of aid during the first four years is remarkable. It is about three times the aid 
disbursed in the equivalent post-conflict phase to Cambodia - a country with more than twice the 
population of Bosnia and arguably much more destruction, and where the international community 
a few years previously had been equally instrumental in bringing the conflict to an end. The aid 
engagement reflected the significance of Bosnia to the major donors and the huge political and 
social impact that the war had in Europe and the United States. More specifically, NATO's military 
intervention in the war and the US orchestration of the peace agreement had given the major donors 
a strong sense of ownership in the peace process. The Dayton Agreement was to a great extent 
"their" peace. The agreement and the government it left in place in Sarajevo represented a victory 
for US and European declared policies in Bosnia, and the donors had strong political incentives to 
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secure their investment and demonstrate their commitment. Massive aid transfers, moreover, could 
seem to atone for past failures to prevent massacres of civilians and ethnic cleansing during the war. 
Important clauses of the peace agreement presumed external financial assistance, above all 
elections, demilitarization, and its opposite program of military assistance to the joint Federation 
army. The return of refugees and IDPs was an integral part of the Dayton Accords and expressed its 
underlying principle of restoring a multicultural Bosnia; this process also required financing, 
especially after 1998. Finally, donors also cited strong economic reasons for immediate and large 
aid transfers, referring to the World Bank’s economic rationale of jump-starting the economy 
(World Bank 1996). The result was a virtual competitive rush to provide aid as soon as the peace 
agreement was signed. 
 
In Cambodia, by contrast, aid levels were low and the aid was phased in slowly over the post-war 
decade. The Paris peace agreement (October 1991) spelled out the desired sequencing in the 
appended Declaration on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia: “The implementation 
of an international aid effort would have to be phased in over a period that realistically 
acknowledges both political and technical imperatives.” (para 5). Why this cautious approach? The 
Vietnamese-supported incumbent regime of Hun Sen was weary of the intentions of the major 
donors. Hun Sen did not solicit major aid flows, evidently wanting to exercise maximum control 
over the post-war reconstruction program. The donors, for their part, concluded that after the 
destructive regime of Khmer Rouge and the at least nominally socialist regime of Hun Sen, 
Cambodia had few structures to support a market-based reconstruction program of the kind 
promoted by themselves and the international financial institutions (IFIs) (Paris 2000, pp. 82-83). 
Making haste slowly consequently made sense. As the aid program got under way, donors 
consistently – although not always correctly – cited lack of absorptive capacity and effective 
administrative structures as reasons for delaying aid or providing only modest amounts (Peou 
2000). Corruption was another major concern. Yet, with respect to governance and absorptive 
capacity, it appeared that the donor community held the Cambodia post-war government to higher 
standards than it were to apply later in other cases. The fact that the international post-conflict aid 
regime at this time was just taking shape, and Cambodia was one of its first cases, might also 
account for the slow pace and modest level of assistance. On closer examination, also this factor 
explains little. The novelty factor did not prevent the UN from mounting one of its largest and at the 
time unprecedented peace missions (UNTAC). In economic aid, terms, moreover, another post-
conflict aid operation that took place towards the end of the decade was equally slow and modest 
(Guatemala).  
 
The underlying but fundamental reason behind donor hesitancy seems political. The Paris peace 
agreement left in power the Vietnamese-installed and supported government of Hun Sen. None of 
the major donors supported the Hun Sen government, and the US vehemently opposed it for reasons 
related to its own defeat in Vietnam (Song 1997). The peace agreement was orchestrated by the 
large powers, but this was not “their peace” in the same way that the Dayton agreement would be. 
All the major powers and donors (perhaps including Moscow), hoped that the elections scheduled 
for 1993 would bring to power a different government led by the erstwhile opposition to Hun Sen, 
and had little incentives to rush in aid in the meantime. In the event, the 1993 elections produced an 
uneasy compromise and a coalition that included a still powerful Hun Sen. By the end of the 
decade, Hun Sen was still Prime Minister but had become more palatable to the donors (particularly 
in comparison with other Khmer political figures) and aid stabilized at a slightly higher level than in 
the first post-war phase. 
(ii) Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala 
The first of the Central American civil wars to come to an end, the Nicaraguan case attracted much 
attention and vast amounts of donor aid. On a per capita basis, the aid level in the post-war decade 
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was substantially above equivalent assistance to El Salvador and ten times higher than in 
Guatemala. The particular circumstances of the Nicaraguan peace settlement help to explain why. 
First, the war was terminated with a series of separate negotiations and pacts in which the 1990 
elections assumed particular importance. The Sandinistas had agreed to abide by the election 
outcome, as had the political opposition, although not the armed opposition (the Contras). The 
unexpected loss of the Sandinistas made it easier to demilitarize the Contras, although this was not a 
foregone conclusion, and the transition from the Sandinistas to the “democratic conservatism” of 
the new, Chamorro-led coalition was fragile and uncertain. (Hartzell 2002, Anderson and Dodd 
2005). As a result, donors - above all the United States - transferred large amounts of aid to secure a 
favourable transition. A successful transition had implications for the region as well. Peace in 
Nicaragua was widely expected to promote a peaceful settlement of the other two civil wars in the 
region, and failure to have the opposite effect. The result was a distinctly frontloaded pattern (Fig 
VI). 
 
 
Fig VI. Official development assistance – El Salvador and Nicaragua 
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Having been deeply involved in the war, the United States had particular incentives to finance a 
transition that would entail the electoral defeat of the Sandinistas, ensconce a US-friendly anti-
Sandinista regime in power and facilitate the reintegrating of Washington's previous Contra clients 
(Lopez-Pintor 1998, McCoy 1998). Generous aid was also a reward for the new government’s 
compliance with gruelling IFI-demands for structural adjustment. In the first three years after the 
February 1990 elections, the donor community disbursed 1.89 billion dollars in concessional aid, of 
which the US alone provided 40%. In 1991, the first year of the Chamorro government, US bilateral 
aid recorded as official development assistance under the OECD/DAC rules was over 460 million 
US dollars. In the same year, donors gave priority to democratic consolidation by collectively 
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providing 350 million dollars in aid for “governance” alone. As the transition seemed secure, and 
the Sandinistas settled into the role of a tamed political opposition, US aid dropped markedly. By 
the time the Sandinistas had registered their second electoral defeat (in 1996), US aid levelled off to 
unremarkable figures (around 30-40 million annually except for additional aid provided in the 
aftermath of the hurricane Mitch in 1998). The Nicaraguan government in Managua, for its part, did 
not inspire sufficient confidence among other donors to attract massive aid. Apart from its 
cooperation on structural adjustment, the government was criticized by donors on many issues, 
including corruption, internal disagreement among the governing coalition partners - “raw 
confrontations over every issue” (Spence 2004, p.12) – and failure to make progress on social 
issues, particularly with anti-poverty measures (IOB 2003 pp. 56-65). 
 
Post-war assistance to El Salvador, by comparison, was quite modest, especially on a per capita 
basis (see Fig VI). Apart from a large one-year commitment early on - which was not matched by 
disbursements - aid levels appear relatively stable throughout the post-war decade. The pattern is 
particularly interesting in view of widespread criticism of the early peace implementation process. 
Central parts of the peace agreement were tardily or only partly implemented, particularly the 
provisions regarding land-for-arms to resettle ex-combatants on both sides, as well as police 
reforms and restructuring of other parts of the judicial system. The issues disrupted the 
implementation negotiations soon after the final agreement was signed, created social tension and 
contributed to high crime levels. To cope with crime waves but constrained by the slow pace of 
police reform, the government chose to deploy military units to maintain public order, thereby 
remilitarizing the social conflict. If money were the issue, this clearly would be a case for 
frontloading aid in order to secure a war-to-peace transition that was as fragile as in Nicaragua, 
although for different reasons. 
 
Why did not donors respond with large and early increases in funding? The national reconstruction 
plan presented by the government had an initial price tag of 1.5 billion (1992), and increased to 1.8 
billion in 1993; by early1994 there was a shortfall of 681 million (Boyce 1996a, p.133). The 
funding gap reflected donor concern with a particular type of absorptive capacity, that is, lack of 
commitment and capacity by the government to implement central parts of the peace agenda. 
(Boyce 1996, de Soto and del Castillo 1994, del Castillo 1997, Whitfield 2001). This affected both 
the land-for-arms exchange and police reform stipulated in the peace agreement. It was manifested 
in the government’s unwillingness to finance more than a fraction of its own national reconstruction 
plan (a modest 480 million of an estimated 1.8 billion), and its resistance to increase taxes and 
reduce military expenditures as donors suggested. The government also failed to institute 
compensatory mechanisms mandated by the peace agreement to cushion the costs of post-war 
structural economic adjustment called for by the IFIs, and which the regime itself fully supported.  12  
 
The consequences in terms of social tension and violence undoubtedly made the war-to-peace 
transition more difficult to the point of generate fears of renewed violence. Additional aid in this 
situation would have increased the government’s budgetary freedom but would not necessarily have 
eased the transition unless conditioned on reform. There was already some donor concern that 
external financing would “crowd in” domestic resource mobilization while leave aside reform 
unless accompanied by effective conditionality (Boyce 1996a). The striking gap between 
                                                 
12 Influential critics have blamed inflexible IFIs, which demanded macroeconomic stability, and stingy donors 
who did not give government additional funds and thereby budgetary freedom to finance social programs. The 
result, it was claimed in a much-cited conclusion, was to set the World Bank and the IMF on a collision 
course with the UN-promoted peace process (de Soto and del Castillo 1994). Subsequent research, however, 
concluded that the government pursued an orthodox macroeconomic policy for reasons of its own and, within 
this budgetary framework, was unwilling to reallocate expenditure to finance social programs (Segovia 1996, 
Boyce 1996a).  
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commitment and disbursement in 1992 -a year of increasing tension and implementation problems 
with the peace agreement – indicates donor recognition that money alone would not suffice and a 
soft conditionality implied by the withholding of promised funds.  
 
In the UN system, one of the lessons from El Salvador was the need to coordinate the economic and 
political aspects of peace negotiations. The World Bank and the IMF were brought into the UN-led 
negotiations at an early stage so they would not negotiate on a separate track for economic 
stabilization and adjustment, as happened in El Salvador. The general profile of post-war aid to 
Guatemala is nevertheless quite similar to that of El Salvador. The annual level in both cases is 
around the 250 million, although Guatemala has almost twice the population of El Salvador. Aid 
disbursements are steady, in fact almost identical year by year for an entire six-year period 
monitored after the 1996 peace agreement. Aid is not frontloaded, even though the peace agreement 
for Guatemala had a more ambitious agenda for socio-economic change than its Salvadorean 
equivalent. As in the Salvadorean case, donors held back in face of reluctance by the Guatemalan 
government to institute reforms rela ted to the peace process, particularly institutional reform of the 
military and intelligence services and the police. The Guatemalan government was equally if not 
more resistant than the post-war Salvadorean government to increase taxes, despite repeated calls 
from donors and IFIs to this effect (Jonas 2000, chp.7). In the circumstances, it was feared that 
additional foreign assistance would either be wasted or also in this case "crowd in" domestic 
resource mobilization.  
(iii) Mozambique and Rwanda 
The front-loaded pattern in Rwanda’s case (Fig VII) expresses a specific and unambiguous aid 
dynamic. The massive aid in the second half of 1994 and 1995 expresses the deep sense of guilt in 
the international community over its failure to stop or stem the genocide, as well as the relief needs 
of the enormous refugee movements that followed in its wake. The abrupt decline in 1996-97 marks 
the new Rwandan government's fall from grace in the eyes of several donors as Rwandan troops 
invaded neighbouring Zaire (DRC) and were credibly accused of committing massacres among the 
refugee populations linked to the genocidaires. At the same time, the government launched its 
program of forced relocation of villagers, a program that came to cause considerable concern and 
criticism among donors (Wageningen 2001). The steady but lower aid levels in subsequent years 
reflect conflicting views among the donors (Uvin 2001). Some invoked a continued obligation to 
help the victims of the genocide, represented by the new government, while  others claimed that the 
authoritarian tendencies of that regime undermined the effectiveness of aid The RPF-government's 
resistance to donor conditionality, and tendency to lay down a conditionality of its own for 
accepting aid, further cooled relations with donors.  
 
The large inflow of aid to Mozambique (Fig VII) in the first two post-war years was a direct 
response to the two-year program for implementing the 1992 peace agreement, and the particular 
significance that the transition in Mozambique had acquired after the failure of a similar peace 
process in Angola. The UN had been centrally involved in both cases, and Mozambique appeared as 
a critical test. As in Bosnia, an external power - in this case Italy - had played a key role in 
organizing the peace negotiations and was prepared to take the lead in financing its implementation. 
The peace agreement was comprehensive and costly. It included a tight schedule for demobilisation 
and return of refugees, both of which were to precede and make meaningful the elections scheduled 
for 1994 (Hume 1994). The elections were particularly costly as the entire infrastructure for 
registration and voting had to be established in a country where close to 25 years of war had 
ravaged an already limited communications structure. Yet elections were essential to move the 
conflict between Frelimo and Renamo out of the military and into the political arena. In addition, 
donors wished to use aid to stabilize the peace agreement by cushioning the effects of the IFI 
requirements for structural adjustment and macroeconomic stability. Unlike in El Salvador, there 
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was a core of donor-government consensus on the need for budgetary outlays to institute social 
reforms and use economic policy (e.g. increasing the minimum wage) to soften the effects of the 
structural adjustment demands that the IFIs laid down soon after the peace agreement was signed. 
Key donors in this respect were long-time supporters of the socialist Mozamican government, 
especially "like-minded group" led by the Scandinavians). Donors responded with political support 
as well; in 1995, for instance, donors collectively sought to modify IMF threats to end ESAF 
support (enhanced structural assistance funding) unless the government undertook further 
macroeconomic reforms (Ball and Barnes, p. 195). The result was a liberally funded peace 
agreement and initial measures to stabilize it. After the 2-year program for implementing the peace 
agreement had ended, aid subsequently reverted to general development assistance at the rate of 
800-1000 million dollars annually. High in absolute terms (although less on a per capita basis, see 
Fig. VIII), the stable infusion of aid reflects the existence of faithful donors - particularly the "like-
minded" countries - who consistently had supported the Mozambican government from the time of 
independence and throughout the war 
 
 
Fig VII: Official Development Assistance - Mozambique and Rwanda 
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4. Post-war aid as strategic behavior 
As this analysis has shown, donors do not simply rush in with aid in the aftermath of war and then 
rapidly scale back. Although donors have been increasingly inclined to"frontload" aid after 1990, 
especially in terms of commitments (as distinct from disbursements, on closer examination a variety 
of post-war aid patterns appear. The magnitude and sequencing of post-war aid can in each case be 
explained with reference to political and economic interests of donors as these relate to - and are 
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shaped by - the particular post-war context of the case. The country cases examined above suggest 
three main patterns. Sketched as  “ideal types”, each expresses a dominant strategic rationale. 
 
a) stabilizing a favourable peace: In this model, major donors have particularly strong interest in 
securing a peace settlement that is favourable but fragile. In Nicaragua, a favored, friendly regime 
was contesting elections; in Mozambique, an internationally applauded war-to-peace transition was 
fragile but had acquired great international symbolic significance as a "test case" (Mozambique); in 
Bosnia, the major powers had been prominently involved in both the war and in negotiating the 
peace and had vested interests in seeing the peace agreement implemented. In such cases, aid 
acquires great political and symbolic value. Apart from the humanitarian and economic rationale for 
financing items required by the peace agreement or identified as essential to relief and 
reconstruction, the overall function of aid is to stabilize and consolidate the peace. In part, this is 
done by funding particular projects such as supporting friendly parties in an election, buying out 
previous militia clients, helping refugees return to vote and ex-combattants to disarm, or giving 
military actors economic incentives to move into the political arena, as did the famous UN "slush-
fund" established for Renamo. Importantly, the institutional and organizational activities that 
accompany a large aid portfolio - donors meetings and in-country coordination committees, 
pledging conferences, establishming aid agency offices and erecting project billboards in the 
countryside, and so on - serve as visible testimony to international support for the new order. It is 
the aid equivalent of the Powell doctrine of "overwhelming force", designed to stabilized a 
favourable but fragile peace. The design entails heavy front-loading of aid, but the magnitudes of 
the first post-war years are rarely sustained precisely because the initial response is considered an 
extraordinary measure and therefore of limited duration.  
 
b) modifying an unfavourable peace: In other cases, major donors have reservations about a peace 
agreement but accept it as the best possible compromise obtainable at the time, or as a useful 
starting point for change. The corresponding aid dynamic, as shown in the Cambodian case, is a 
slow phasing-in of modest levels of assistance, coupled with strict conditionality on economic and 
governance criteria. A slow phasing-in or over-all modest levels of post-war aid may also suggest 
some indifference to the peace agreement or concern about lack of absorptive capacity. Both factors 
shaped the post-war aid policy to El Salvador and Guatemala. Whether intended or not, the effects 
contributed to a modification of the peace in the sense that central parts of the reform agenda of 
both agreements were not implemented. 
  
c) adjusting post-war policies 
Once the initial peace (whether favourable or not) seems stabilized, other donor concerns about the 
developing the post-war order move to the forefront. This can entail reductions in relation to human 
rights criteria, governance measures or aid effectiveness. When it became clear that the post-war 
regime in Rwanda was associated with massive human rights violations, regionalized conflict and 
internal political exclusion, several donors decided to reduce aid. The decline in aid gave the aid 
profile for the post-war decade as a whole a distinctly front-loaded profile. A similar non-sustained 
aid profile appears in Bosnia, reflecting in part concern with aid effectiveness.  
 
What, then, is the effect of these aid patterns on the stability of peace in the short run and its 
consolidation in the longer run? 
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5. Post-war aid, growth and peace 
The answer given by Collier&Hoeffler and reaffirmed in a principal World Bank publication on 
conflict and development (2003) is straightforward: economic growth is associated with peace, 
hence aid strategies that maximize growth in the post-conflict situation should be adopted. Aid is 
particularly growth-effective if provided in great magnitudes and properly phased in,. To achieve 
this effect, aid should not be frontloaded but slowly phased to peak in the middle of the post-war 
decade.  
 
Both the premises on which this recommendation rests are controversial. The conclusion regarding 
growth-effectiveness of aid in post-conflict countries is based on a small and quite heterogeneous 
sample. A retesting with slight variations in the sample produced a much smaller impact of aid on 
growth (120% less) (Suhrke, Villanger and Woodward, 2005). The diverging results indicate fragile 
relationships. As for growth and peace, there is a strong connection between the wealth of a nation 
and the incidence of civil war (World Bank 2003, Humphreys and Varshney 2004, HSR 2005,) but 
it is less certain that the process of economic growth is a source of domestic peace. The claim by 
Collier&Hoeffler in this regard rests on a previous study that examined the causes of civil war 
(Collier&Hoeffler 2002). Another study subsequently found that growth collapse was associated 
with subsequent conflict onset (Miguel et al 2004, cited in Humphreys and Varshney 2004). These 
findings make not be equally applicable to the risk of new violence in a post-conflict situation, 
however. Neither study makes allowance for the distinct nature of post-civil war situations, which 
include the legacy of previous violence such as a political economy of war and a culture of 
violence, physical destruction and issues of reconciling previous enemies. Even if the general 
statistical relation between growth and civil war found by Collier& Hoeffler applied, the numbers 
are discouraging. One percentage increase in economic growth sreduces the risk of civil war with 
only one percent as well. Thus, if other indicators suggest a high risk of civil war – say 70% risk, as 
Collier&Hoeffler found for pre-DRC Zaire – a truly amazing growth rate of 20% would be required 
to bring the risk down to a fifty-fifty chance (Collier and Hoeffler 2002a). 
 
The qualitative literature places more emphasis on the kind of growth that is taking place, 
particularly its distributiver characteristics. One classic case is Pakistan’s civil war that led to the 
establishment of Bangladesh. The war was preceded and partly provoked by rapid economic growth 
that was unevenly distributed between the contesting regions (Muscat 2002). Recent work by 
Frances Stewart points to the role of horizontal inequalities as a cause of civil war, and the 
importance of addressing such inequalities to prevent renewed new violence after the war (Stewart 
2005). A systematic comparative study of post-conflict situations found that the typical growth 
strategies recommended by IFIs and donors in post-conflict situations – reforms for macro-
economic stability and market-oriented structural adjustment – tend to generate social conflict 
rather than social peace (Paris 2000). Earlier work by Boyce and colleagues concluded that socio-
economic equality was a significant condition of reduced social violence (Boyce et al. 1996). 
 
Our seven country cases show no obvious relationship between economic growth and peace. Ten 
years after the war, all seven remain at peace in the sense understood by many civil war studies, 
including the World Bank research, that is, as not being at war.13 Yet post-war economic growth 
rates decade have varied markedly during the first post-war. Measures as GDP per capita, growth 
rates fell into three distinct categories:14  
                                                 
13 Following the Singer&Small pioneering work on Correlates of War, Collier&Hoeffler define war as as 
sustaining 1000 combat deaths per year, with casualties incurred on both sides.  
14 Based on the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, 2005 (CD-rom) 
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(i) boom and decline: Bosnia’s post-war growth rates starts in the 79-32% range but drops 
radically in the third year after peace to hover around a 2% level. El Salvador follows a 
similar but much milder pattern. The reconstruction boom of around 5% drops in fifth 
year of peace to the 0 –2 range. 
(ii) stagnation: Some countries did not even experience a post-war boom, but settled 
straight into a dismally low rate. Guatemala ’s growth rates ranged from slightly 
negative to plus 2%. Nicaragua had a negative growth rate of 2-3% during the first four 
years of peace, rising to 1-2% level and only surpassed 4% in 1999.  
(iii) steady growth: Only three countries have steady growth rates in the 3-7% range for 
most of the post-war decade, and higher in some years. Data for Cambodia’s first two 
post-war years (1992-93), is not available, but for most of the next nine years the 
economy grew steadily at 3-5%, only once dipping to around 1%, but rebounding the 
next year with a remarkable 8.3%. Mozambique’s steady growth rate averaged 6% 
annually for the first seven years of peace. Interrupted by the severe floods in 2000, the 
growth rate was back to over 10% the following year. Rwanda had a marked post-war 
economic boom but avoided the boom-and-decline pattern by maintaining growth rates 
in the 3-6% range for most of the subsequent years.  
 
While it is hazardous to generalize from a small-N qualitative analysis, these cases show that a 
reasonably high and steady economic growth is neither a sufficient nor even a necessary condition 
for post-war peace. Nor does our sample show a straightforward relationship between economic 
growth and the quality of the post-war peace as indicated by UNDP’s human development index, 
HDI (Fig VIII). Only one of the steady-growth cases (Cambodia) improved its HDI ranking during 
the first post-war decade, while the other two (Rwanda and Mozambique) fell further back. The two 
stagnating growth cases (Guatemala and Nicaragua) likewise slipped in HDI ranking position. The 
mild boom-and-decline case (El Salvador) improved its ranking, however. No comparable data is 
available for the more extreme boom-and-decline case of Bosnia, but ample evidence of post-war 
stagnation – including large-scale unemployment, illegal emigration and corruption – has made the 
area appear in other parts of the region as “the black hole of Europe” (International Commission on 
the Balkans 2005). The effect of aid on the quality of peace likewise seems to be equivocal. As Fig 
VII shows, the highest recipients of ODA per capita in the post-war decade all slipped in their HDI 
ranking. The third largest recipient of aid, Mozambique, not only fell slightly, but remained almost 
at the bottom of the scale. Of course, the slippage might have been even worse without aid. But it is 
remarkable that the country which received least aid (Cambodia) was the only one that made 
significant upward gains on the HDI ranking  
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Fig. VIII. Post-war aid, growth and the quality of peace 
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Since economic growth and large-scale aid are not necessary preconditions for post-war peace, aid 
strategies that prioritize economic growth in the post-war decade may well be inappropriate if the 
primary objective is to stabilize and sustain the peace. But does our small-N qualitative analysis 
indicate which strategies are more effective in this respect?  
 
It is useful at the outset to make a distinction similar to that made by IFIs in economic policy 
between short-term stabilization and medium-to-long term adjustment. The equivalent of macro-
economic stabilization would be peace stabilization, i.e. to secure elements of the peace agreement 
relating to the immediate transition from a military to a political mode of conflict. This would 
include the increasingly standardized aid programs established in post-conflict situations, such as 
demobilization, return of refugees, reintegration schemes, and mechanisms for dealing with the 
conflict in political terms (elections, power-sharing), relief (especially for IDPs and refugees), and 
immediate reconstruction to provide evidence of a peace dividend and offer alternatives to the war 
economy. These stabilization schemes come with a price tag, which tend to produce a front-loaded 
aid profile. Rather than a problem, this strategy can be a solution. Targeted programs were critically 
important in stabilizing a fragile peace in several of our country cases. In Mozambique, well-placed 
aid helped secure demobilization prior to the elections, and early elections, with special funding 
assistance to the rebels, were essential to move the conflict into the political arena (CMI 1997). In 
Cambodia, a massive operation for early return of refugees ensured that the opponents of Hun Sen 
could not easily recruit manpower among the displaced masses on the Thai-Cambodian border to 
resume the military struggle (Williams 1997). In Nicaragua, huge aid inflows to secure and sustain 
electoral victory for the non-Sandinistas served, if ironically, to maintain the peace since the US 
probably would have continued its armed support for the Contras if the Sandinistas had retained 
governmental power (Hartzell 2002). By contrast, but to affirm the point, limited support for the 
lands-for-arms exchange in El Salvador, as well as related measures to provide employment and 
social security, seemed in 1992 sufficiently serious to jeopardize the newly concluded peace 
agreement(Wood 2003.).  
 
                                                 
15 Annual average per capita in the posty-war period, as shown in top row. Values in US 2002 dollars, 
rounded to nearest ,000. Population figure used is from a mid-point in the post-war period. 
16 Data for first year of peace not available. 
17 Data for first year of peace not available. 
18 The final peace agreement was signed in 1996, but peace negotiations in 1993 marked a significant decline 
in violence. 
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The importance of early, targeted aid programs to stabilize the peace has been emphasized in the 
general post-conflict literature as well (Woodward 2002). Their precise nature is likely to vary 
across cases, e.g. with employment creation being less important in Cambodia than in El Salvador, 
not to mention Bosnia. Whether massive frontloading of aid also has a general stabilizing effect on 
the peace, as the strategic rationale outlined above assumes, is more difficult to determine. As we 
have seen, aid patterns varied significantly among our seven cases, but peace was eventually 
sustained in all. Some cases nevertheless suggest that frontloading aid does have a general peace 
stabilizing effect, and vice versa. Of the seven, the most fragile post-war peace was probably in 
Cambodia, where the peace agreement was challenged military (by the Khmer Rouge) and 
politically (by the royalist faction). Cambodia also stood out for its cautious and slowly phased in 
aid program. Although the UN mounted a large peacekeeping mission, donor decisions not to 
underwrite a generous aid program immediately probably had an encouraging effect on the regime’s 
opponents. By contrast, in Nicaragua - another fragile peace situation - massive US aid by 
signalling Washington’s desire to stabilize a particular peace and the costs of alternative outcomes. 
In Bosnia, early and massive aid commitment likewise underscored the importance the major 
donors attached to the implementation of the Dayton Agreement.  
 
Although peace in the sense of no war has been sustained in all the seven cases, underlying 
structures of inequality or political exclusion associated with past violence remain in most cases. In 
some cases this has produced widespread, low-level forms of violence, as in Guatemala (Prophette 
et a. 2003), become transposed into regional conflicts pursued across borders, as seen in Rwanda’s 
role in neighbouring DRC (Longman 2002), or the political economy of war has left a legacy of 
violence associated with the illegal economy whose effects are typically magnified by massive post-
war unemployment, as in Bosnia (Pugh et al. 2004). If such structural sources of violence remain, 
what would be the equivalent of structural adjustment for peace? The diagnosis in part gives the 
answer. In all our seven cases, distributional issues were central, underlying causes of war, whether 
relating to classes (Central America), regions (Mozambique), ethnic groups (Rwanda) or ethno-
political entities (the former Yugoslavia). Distributional issues concerned socio-economic goods as 
well as access to political power. Although the post-war situation obviously is not identical to the 
pre-war situation, in terms of both local power relations and grievances and, perhaps above all, the 
international context, the proven violence-generating potential of structures of inequality and 
exclusion cannot be ignored. The consequent policy implication for post-war aid strategies is that 
structural adjustment for peace should focus on three broad areas: (i) modify systemic inequalities 
among groups (horizontal inequalities), (ii) promote institutional structures for inclusive political 
representation, and (iii) transform the structures of violence created by the war itself, whether 
associated with agents of the state or non-state actors. 
 
These policy implications may not be equally relevant for all post-war cases. Our sample does not 
include recent African conflicts (notably Sierra Leone, Liberia). If, or when, the post-war period is 
prolonged in these cases, the effect of aid interventions over time could be similarly assessed. 
6. Conclusion 
This article has mapped the patterns of post-war aid with a view to identifying patterns of 
sequencing and magnitude. It found that contrary to other studies and conventional wisdom in aid 
circles, post-war aid is not always front-loaded immediately after peace is declared and then rapidly 
phased out. When this happens, the policy rests on a convincing strategic rationale and tends to 
have a stabilizing effect. Using a small-N qualitative analysis, we found that high levels of post-war 
aid and rapid economic growth are not necessary preconditions for sustained post-war peace. Nor 
are aid levels and economic growth rates clearly related to the quality of peace, as measured by the 
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HDI. More important are the nature of aid strategies, which fall in two categories (i) strategies to 
stabilize peace in the short run through targeted programs, and, arguably, (ii) structural adjustment 
to sustain peace in the longer run that focus on distributional issues and modifying the structural 
legacies of war.   
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